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NAFTA's Article 1110 -
Can Regulation be Expropriation?
Kevin Banks*
In recent months, a number of corporate investors in Canada, the United States, and
Mexico have filed claims seeking compensation for economic losses that they allegedly
suffered as a result of environmental laws and other regulatory measures. These claims
have sparked considerable debate and controversy. 1 Environmental and labor groups
argue that such claims pose a fundamental challenge to a government's ability to regulate
private economic activity in the public interest.2 Some trade lawyers have defended the
suits as simply enforcing an international obligation to compensate foreign investors for
the expropriation of their property.3 Others, however, have expressed concern that using
NAFTA's chapter 11 to challenge the traditional regulatory functions of government
could lead to a political backlash and that, in response, governments may adopt a restrict-
ed interpretation of the chapter or eliminate it altogether.4 The Canadian government has
proposed that NAFTA member countries adopt an interpretation of chapter 1 l's expro-
priation provisions, which would exclude "normal regulation" from their reach. 5
However, Mexico has expressed hesitancy concerning this proposal.6
S.J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School. LL.B, University of Toronto (1989). The author is
Senior Labor Law Advisor with the Secretariat of the Commission for Labor Cooperation, the
international institution established under the labor side agreement to NAFTA. The views
expressed in this article are those of the author and not of the Commission for Labor
Cooperation or any party to the North American Agreement for Labor Cooperation.
1. See U.S. Firm Brings NAFTA Investor Suit Against Canadian PCB Export Ban, [Vol. 5, No. 23] AM.
TRADE, Nov. 12, 1998, at 1, 12 (describing filing by a coalition of environmental non-governmental
organizations and the Canadian Labour Congress with the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation in response to a chapter 11 investor claim); see also Newest Investor-State Case in
Canada Targets Softwood LumberAccord, [Vol. 6, No. 4] AM. TRADE, Feb. 25, 1999, at 1, 10 (describ-
ing concerns of environmental and other non-governmental organizations).
2. See id.
3. See Trade Lawyers Clash on Changes to NAFTA Investor-State Clause, [Vol. 6, No. 6] AM. TRADE,
Mar. 25, 1999, at 6 (stating the views of Barry Appleton, who has represented a number of
chapter 11 complainants).
4. See id. at 5 for the views of J. Patrick Berry.
5. See Edward Alden, Canada Seeks Tighter NAFTA Rules to Limit Compensation, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
22, 1999, at 7; see also Canadian Memo Identifies Options for Changing NAFTA Investment
Rules, [Vol. 6, No. 3] AM. TRADE, Feb. 11, 1999, at 1; see also Canada Wrestles with Ways to
Change NAFTA Investor-State Clause, [Vol. 6, No. 5] AM. TRADE, Mar. 11, 1999, at 1.
6. See Canada, Mexico to Square Off on NAFTA Investor-State Clause, [Vol. 6, No. 81 AM. TRADE,
Apr. 22, 1999, at 1.
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At the center of this debate lies the legal question of whether a bona fide regulatory
measure with a public purpose can constitute "expropriation" for the purposes of
NAFTA's article 1110.7 Article 1110(1) provides:
No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment
of an investor of another Party in its territory, or take a measure tantamount
to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment ("expropriation")
except:
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis;
(c) in accordance with due process of law and article 1105(1); and
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs
2 through 6.
Thus, whenever a party directly or indirectly nationalizes, expropriates, or takes a
measure tantamount to nationalizing or expropriating an investment, it may be held
liable for the payment of compensation at fair market value in accordance with articles
1110(2)-(6). Part B of chapter 11 allows a foreign investor to obtain direct compensation
from a member government for a breach of article 1110. The dispute resolution mecha-
nism contained in Part B is the first provision of its kind to be included in a multilateral
trade or investment agreement.
A requirement to pay compensation could directly undermine many types of proper-
ty use regulation. Regulations are often aimed directly at recalibrating the balance
between the property owners' interests and social objectives by reallocating risks, redefin-
ing entitlements, and shifting costs. Requiring compensation would in effect reverse such
a course of action. This has been particularly evident to practitioners in the field of envi-
ronmental protection, 8 where the application of the long-recognized "polluter pays" prin-
ciple, 9 requiring the polluter to "bear the expenses of carrying out [pollution prevention]
measures decided by public authorities to ensure that the environment is an acceptable
state;' could be entirely undone by compensation requirements.
This article is intended to provide a preliminary analysis of some key questions
raised by the debates over recent chapter 11 claims. It will consider some implications of
the general arguments underlying those claims for the traditional regulatory function of
governments and whether those arguments find support in international law. I will argue
that (1) the regulatory measures impugned by the claims cannot easily be distinguished
from a wide range of laws regulating economic activity for public purposes without
resorting to political judgments concerning priorities among such purposes and the
effectiveness of the means by which they are pursued; (2) because of the breadth and flex-
ibility of the class of property rights protected by chapter 11, using an economic effects-
7. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, pt. 5, ch. 11, art. 1110, 32 I.L.M. 605,639.
8. See I. Martin Wagner, International Investment, Expropriation and Environmental Protection, 29
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 465, 528 (1999).
9. This principle was adopted in 1972 by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development. See Recommendation on Guiding Principles Concerning International
Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies, OECD, C(72) 128 (1972).
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based test to determine whether compensation is owed would generate potential liability
for a wide range of regulatory measures; and (3) the wording of article 1110 and relevant
case law plausibly support excluding bona fide regulatory measures from the scope of the
article's compensation obligations, but the law on this point remains ambiguous and
uncertain. I will close by sounding a note of caution about using domestic law as a source
of doctrine to close gaps in the relevant international law because of some key differences
in the treatment of property rights in Canada and the United States.
I. The Scope of Claims Made under Article 1110.
Information on chapter 11 cases is somewhat difficult to obtain due to the confiden-
tiality of proceedings. A brief summary of available information with respect to five
claims by investors alleging that NAFTA parties have violated article 1110 will illustrate
the general themes of these claims and the challenges that they pose to the regulation of
property use.
A. THE METALCLAD CASE.
10
On January 2, 1997, the Metalclad Corporation filed a claim with the International
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes against the government of Mexico. II
The claim alleges that the decision of the Governor of the State of San Luis Potosi to deny
Quimica Omega de Mexico, a Metalclad subsidiary, permission to operate a waste man-
agement facility constituted an expropriation of that facility. Metalclad had been autho-
rized by the Mexican federal government to operate the facility in 1995 and was aware at
that time that both the construction and operation of such facilities are subject to envi-
ronmental regulation. Metalclad claims to have invested $22 million in preparing the
facility for operation. In response to protests by environmentalists and local citizens the
Governor ordered that the facility be shut down. The decision was supported by a geolog-
ical study allegedly showing that the facility was located on an underground alluvial
stream and could contaminate the local water supply. The Governor went on to declare
that the site of the facility would form part of a much larger ecological reserve. Metalclad
claims the full value of the facility, which it values at $90 million dollars.
B. THE ETHYL CASE.
U.S.-based Ethyl Corporation filed a Notice of Arbitration in April 1997 and then
followed up with a Statement of Claim in October 1997. It alleged that a Canadian federal
law banning the import or trade between provinces of methylcyclopentadienyl man-
ganese tricarbonyl (MMT), a gasoline additive, expropriated its Canadian investment in
10. This summary is based upon information contained in I. Martin Wagner, supra note 8, at 488-
91; see also Mexicans to Counter U.S. Firm in NAFTA Investor-State Case, [Vol.5, No.41 AM.
TRADE, Feb 19, 1998, at 5.
11. See Wagner, supra note 8, at 489, n.100.
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the production and sale of MMT. 12 Ethyl contended that the ban was a discriminatory
measure designed to protect domestic industry rather than a legitimate environmental or
health protection measure. The Canadian government claimed that MMT posed health
risks.13 Ethyl sought U.S. $250 million in compensation, including amounts for lost sales
and profits in Canada and amounts spent on lobbying to defeat the ban.1 4 In July 1998,
following a ruling by a Canadian domestic tribunal1 5 that the MMT trade prohibition
violated Canada's Agreement on Internal Trade, 16 the Canadian government settled
Ethyl's claim. Under the terms of the settlement the Canadian government paid Ethyl
approximately U.S. $13 million and issued a letter to Ethyl stating that there is no scientif-
ic evidence showing that MMT poses a health risk.1 7
C. THE S.D. MYERS CASE.
In November 1995, the Canadian government prohibited the export of PCB wastes
from Canada to the United States.18 Earlier measures had prohibited such exports to all
other countries. The stated grounds for the ban included complying with international
obligations under the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal' 9 and ensuring that volatile PCB's did not return to
contaminate the Canadian environment in the event that they were not properly disposed
of in the United States. The ban lasted for fifteen months, after which time it was rescind-
ed with respect to treatment and destruction but not landfilling, on the basis of the
Canadian government's review of new environmental measures enacted in the United
States to deal with imported PCB waste. 20 In July 1998, U.S.-based S.D. Myers
Corporation alleged in a Notice of Arbitration that during its life the ban had prevented it
from completing its then existing contracts to process, distribute, and treat PCB-contami-
nated waste from customers in Canada. S.D. Myers claimed that this action was tanta-
mount to expropriation of those contracts.
2 1
12. See Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Notice of Arbitration Under the Arbitration Rules of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law and the North American Free Trade
Agreement 6 (Apr. 14, 1997) [hereinafter Notice of Arbitration]; see also HOWARD MANN &
KONRAD VON MILTKE, NAFTA's CHAPTER 11 AND THE ENVIRONMENT: ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF
THE INVESTOR-STATE PROCESS 44, n.2 (International Institute for Sustainable Development
Working Paper 1999).
13. SeeWagner, supra note 8, at 491.
14. See Notice of Arbitration, supra note 12, cited in Wagner, supra note 8, at 492.
15. See Wagner, supra note 8, at 495 (construing Report of the Article 1704 Panel Concerning a
Dispute Between Alberta and Canada Regarding the Manganese Fuel Additives Act, File no.
97/98-15-MMT-Po58, June 12, 1998).
16. See Agreement on Internal Trade, R.S.C. 1996, ch. 17 (Can.); see also Wagner, supra note 8, at
495.
17. See Shawn McCarthy, Failed Ban Becomes Selling Point for MMT, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, July 21,
1998, at A3 (Can.) (cited in Wagner, supra note 8, at n.132).
18. See Export and Import of Hazardous Waste Regulations, SOR/92-637, P.C. 1992-2284, (1992).
19. See Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes & Their
Disposal, U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG.80./3, 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989) (entered into force May 5, 1992).
20. See Wagner, supra note 8, at 499-500.
21. See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit Claim to Arbitration, July 21, 1998
(reprinted in AM. TRADE, Sept. 3, 1998, at 24, 25) [hereinafter S.D. Myers case].
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D. THE LOEWEN CASE.
In October 1998, the Canadian-based Loewen Corporation launched a claim contend-
ing that a Mississippi state law requiring it to post a bond totaling 125 percent of a $500 mil-
lion jury award of punitive damages against it pending appeal of that award amounted to
uncompensated expropriation. 22 The company alleged that the posting of such a bond
would require it to pay fees that would exceed, in its view, the value of a generous settlement
of the claim against it that had resulted in the punitive damage award. Loewen eventually set-
tled the case for U.S. $150 million. Its chapter 11 claim included a claim for the value of the
settlement and for its stock's loss in value subsequent to the settlement.
E. THE METHANEX CASE.
In July 1999, Canadian-based Methanex Corp. issued a Notice of Arbitration stating
that it would seek compensation for the effects of the California government's decision to
phase out the use of methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) by the end of year 2002.23
Methanex produces methanol, one of two key ingredients in MTBE. The company argued
in its Notice that MTBE is the second largest end-use for methanol, and the California
ban deprived it of one of its largest markets, thus expropriating a substantial part of its
market capitalization and potential profits. It estimates the value of its claim at U.S.
$970,000,000.
1. Common Themes: Challenges to Regulations based on their Economic Effects.
Each claim seeks compensation for the effects of government regulatory measures, as
opposed to a transfer of property rights by the government to itself or another entity.
Moreover, leaving aside the questions raised in the Ethyl case concerning the bona fides of
the impugned regulations, 24 in each of these cases the measures with respect to which
22. See Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Notice of Claim, Oct. 30, 1998 [hereinafter Notice of
Claim]; see also Brian Milner, Loewen Invokes NAFTA Clause, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Nov. 16,
1998; see also Harmonization Project, Briefing Paper, Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States (visit-
ed Oct. 31, 1999) <www.harmonizationalert.org/NAFTA/16ewen.htm>.
23. See Methanex Corporation, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim under Article 1119, sec. B, ch.
11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, July 2, 1999 [hereinafter Notice of Intent]
(on file with author).
24. See Notice of Arbitration, supra note 12, at 4, cited in Wagner, supra note 8, at 493. The Ethyl
case also raises the question of what margin of error will be allowed to regulators under the
standard of review employed by chapter 11 tribunals. Environmentalists have warned that the
threat of compensation actions under chapter 11 could have a chilling effect upon environ-
mental regulation by raising the threat that, in the absence of full scientific proof to justify
such measures, compensation could be required. This in turn would undermine the "precau-
tionary principle," which requires that environmental protection measures not be delayed in
the absence of full scientific certainty concerning the causes, nature, and extent of an environ-
mental hazard. See United Nations Conference on Environment & Development: Rio Declaration
on the Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.I (1992), princ. 15,
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 ("Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack
of fill scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures
to prevent environmental degradation."); see other instruments cited in Wagner, supra note 8,
at 532, n.281. Consideration of the standard of review of regulatory action is beyond the scope
of this paper.
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compensation is sought serve an apparent public purpose. In Metalclad, Ethyl, S.D.
Myers, and Methanex, the measures in question are prohibitions, with the apparent aim
of environmental protection, on the selling of specified products or services. In the
Loewen case, the measure in question appears to be designed to ensure that a party
appealing a judgment does not use the right of appeal as a means of obtaining time dur-
ing which to dispose of assets that might be seized in satisfaction of a judgment.
Moreover, each claim points, as a basis for a right to compensation, to a mix of
alleged interference with property rights and resulting substantial economic effects on the
claimant's property. The Notice of Arbitration in the Ethyl case states that an expropria-
tion exists "whenever there is a substantial and unreasonable interference with the enjoy-
ment of a property right' 25 though it offers no definition of "substantial" or "unreason-
able." The Notice goes on to claim a right to compensation based on the effects, known
beforehand to the government, of the MMT ban on its business. 26 S.D. Myers bases its
claim on allegations that the effect of the ban on PCB exports was to totally frustrate its
Canadian operations. 27 Methanex's Notice of Intent states that because the California
government's phasing out of MTBE will end Methanex's U.S. business of selling methanol
for use of MTBE in California there is a taking of Methanex's U.S. business and invest-
ment in its U.S. subsidiary.28 The Loewen claim goes further, asserting that "under inter-
national law an expropriation occurs where government action interferes with an alien's
use and enjoyment of property.''29
Chapter 11 is thus treated as providing investors with an indemnity against the risk
of economic losses due to at least some forms of regulation that substantially limit their
ability to exercise property rights. Below, I will demonstrate that it is difficult to separate
the regulations impugned by the claims from types of regulations that form longstand-
ing parts of the legal and social landscape in North America. For this purpose I will draw
upon examples from the field of labor and employment law. I will also argue that if the
economic effects of a regulation are considered in determining whether compensation is
owed, the scope for compensation claims cannot easily be limited without narrowing the
scope of protected property interests, which would run contrary to the language of
chapter 11.
2. The Potential Reach of the Claims: From Property into Politics?
While opponents and critics of international investment agreements have often
voiced concern that such agreements could directly impede environmental regulation
efforts by creating compensation obligations, they have seldom expressed the same con-
cerns with respect to labor regulation.30 However, if a substantial interference with the
25. Notice of Arbitration, supra note 12, at 11, cited in Wagner, supra note 8, at 492, n. 117.
26. Notice of Arbitration, supra note 12, at paras. 14,32, cited in H. MANN & K. VON MILTKE, supra
note 12.
27. See MANN &VoN MILTKE, supra note 12.
28. See generally Notice of Intent, supra note 23.
29. Notice of Claim, supra note 22, at paras. 164-166, cited in MANN & VON MILTKE, supra note 26,
at 42.
30. See TONY CLARKE & MAUDE BARLOW, THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT AND THE
THREAT TO CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY 61 (1997).
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right to sell a product or service gives rise to a right to compensation, then it is hard to see
how measures such as the "Hot Goods" provisions of the U.S. Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) 3 1 could avoid falling within the class of measures potentially creating liability.
Those provisions prohibit the shipment of any goods worked on by employees paid in
violation of minimum wage or overtime rules of the FLSA or in an establishment in
which oppressive child labor is used. 32 They empower the U.S. Department of Labor to
seize goods and block their shipment in order to enforce these rules.
More generally, it is hard to see how interfering with rights to sell products and ser-
vices can be distinguished from interference with rights to purchase the fundamental
inputs into the production process. It could be argued, on the basis of the principle, that
"labor is not a commodity' 33 that labor and employment relations are different from
other economic relations and therefore are open to uncompensated regulation in a way
that other economic relations may not be. However, it is not clear that the premise of this
argument is distinguishable from the "polluter pays" principle, 34 which is clearly chal-
lenged by some of the claims. Both have achieved recognition as important international
legal principles. 35 Neither is clearly given priority over chapter 11 in the text of NAFTA.
While international recognition of the polluter pays principle is more recent, chronologi-
cal order hardly provides a basis for principled distinctions between the level of immuni-
ty from compensation obligations afforded to different types of regulatory measures.
Labor laws impose a number of constraints upon employers' decisions with respect
to who to hire and what terms and conditions of employment to provide. These con-
straints have cost implications. In Canada and the United States, labor relations laws
require employers to bargain with the certified representative of the majority of a bar-
gaining unit of their employees, thus constraining the freedom of employers to contract
for labor as they choose. 36 Collective bargaining laws can lead to higher prices for an
employer's workforce. 37 More dramatically, they can also, in cases of collective bargaining
disputes, lead to the involuntary closure of an employer's operation during a strike. This'
is particularly the case where the law prevents the hiring of replacement workers. For'
example, under Mexican labor law an employer facing a strike may not use replacement
workers, forcing the operation to temporarily shut down. 38 Similar measures can be
found in some Canadian jurisdictions. 39 Needless to say, these rules can make entire
plants unprofitable for the duration of any strike action.
31. See29 U.S.C. § 201.
32. See id. §§ 12(a) and 15(a).
33. See CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, ANNEX - DECLARATION
CONCERNING THE AIMS AND PURPOSES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION
(Declaration of Philadelphia), art. 1.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See Secretariat of the Commission for Labor Cooperation, Preliminary Report to the
Ministerial Council - Labour and Industrial Relations Law in Canada, the United States and
Mexico (Dallas: Commission for Labor Cooperation, 1996).
37. R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? (1984).
38. Secretaria del Trabajo y Prevision Social, L.F.T., 12a Edicion 1996 (Mexico: STPS, 1996) art. 4.
39. See R.S.B.C., § 68; Que Labour Code, § 109(1)(a).
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Labor laws can also reach into management's decision-making authority. Labor laws
in Canada and the United States prohibit employers from acting upon the basis of anti-
union motivation.40 Thus, in some Canadian jurisdictions, an employer that contracts
out an operation in order to avoid unionization may be ordered to reopen that operation
and rehire unionized workers. 4 1 Co-determination laws in Germany grant unions repre-
senting workers in companies of a certain size fifty percent of the seats on the board of
directors of the company.42 It is interesting to note that when these laws were introduced,
a serious scholarly effort was made to argue that, with respect to foreign-owned corpora-
tions operating in Germany, this legislation gave rise to compensation obligations under
international law.4 3
A similar exercise could no doubt be repeated with examples from other fields of
public law. Thus, it appears that the argument underpinning the claims-that regulations
that substantially restrict property rights and result in substantial loss of property rights
value should be compensable-could potentially interfere with a wide range of powers to
regulate social and economic life. In theory, the public purposes served by regulation
could be accommodated consistently with that argument in one of two ways. First, priori-
ties could be established among regulatory purposes, with more pressing purposes receiv-
ing an exemption from compensation obligations. A variation on this approach involves
balancing property holder interests against competing public purposes. Second, the scope
of protected interests could be reduced. Each approach will be briefly addressed in turn.
a. A Pathway into Politics? - Priorities and Balancing of Public Purposes.
The obvious objection to giving priority to some public purposes over others is that
this is precisely the function of domestic legislatures and would thus constitute an overt
imposition of value judgments by unelected international officials upon domestic poli-
tics. Some might argue that a measure of deference to domestic legislatures could be
secured by using a balancing test that would, for example, weigh the reasonableness of the
regulatory objective, the proportionality of the regulatory means used to achieve that
objective, and the extent of interference with property rights. This is in effect what the
European Court of Justice did once it read protection of property rights into European
Community law.44
There is, however, a set of related legal and political problems with applying a balanc-
ing test under NAFTA's chapter 11. There is no express authorization for this type of test
40. See Secretariat of the Commission for Labor Cooperation, supra note 36.
41. See generallyG.ADAMS, CANADIAN LABOUR LAW 10-133 - 10-135 (2d ed. 1993).
42. See Martin Baethge and Harold Wolf, Continuity and Change in the German Model of Industrial
Relations, in EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY (T. Kochan & M. Piore
eds., 1995).
43. Wilhelm Wengler, Parity Codetermination in West German Companies and West German
Companies and International Law, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1976). Similar claims were ulti-
mately litigated without success under German domestic law, but never pressed tinder interna-
tional law. See Rudolph Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation and Alien Property, 1 ICSID REVIEW -
FOREIGN INVEST. L.. 41 (1986).
44. See Hauer v. Rheinland-Pfatz, Case 44/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3727; see generally Michael Antinori,
Does Lochner Live in Luxembourg?: An Analysis of the Property Rights Jurisprudence of the
European Court of Justice, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1778 (1995).
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in the text of the agreement. Moreover, outside of Europe, international law has not
adopted the use of a balancing approach, but has instead generally sought to distinguish
categorically between "takings," "expropriations:' and the like on the one hand, and non-
compensable measures on the other.45 Explicitly, if not implicitly, U.S. domestic law simi-
larly uses a categorical rather than a balancing approach to constitutional property rights
protection. 46 While Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms requires a judicial assess-
ment of the reasonableness and proportionality of certain human rights infringements,
the drafters of the Charter expressly chose not to include property rights within this con-
stitutional regime. 47 Thus, the adoption of a balancing approach under NAFTA would
run counter to several legal currents of more direct relevance to North American interna-
tional legal relations than the jurisprudence of the European Courts.
From a political perspective, while balancing tests seek to build a measure of deference
into legal decision-making rules, they nonetheless require to a certain degree, explicitly or
implicitly, the weighing of social objectives in relation to each other and in relation to the
interests of property owners. They may also require an assessment of the feasibility of differ-
ent means of achieving social objectives in order to determine the proportionality of regula-
tory means to ends. While in Canada this kind of judicial assessment appears to have been
accepted in relation to human rights protections, this acceptance was on the basis of consti-
tutional language expressly providing for it and following a rejection of such an approach in
the realm of property rights protection and economic relations more generally.48
b. Could an Economic Effects-based Compensation Rule be Self-Limiting?
The scope of property rights protection could be limited by restricting the class of
property interests or by making only the most serious of economic effects compensable.
More specifically, either (1) a narrow definition of the property interests protected by
45. When the European Court of Justice recognized the protection of property rights under
Community law it drew upon the European Convention on Human Rights and the jurispru-
dence of the European Court of Human Rights under that Convention. That jurisprudence
interprets article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention as authorizing judicial weighing of
proportionality and reasonableness of regulatory objectives in relation to effects on property
interests. Article 1 of the Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights provides:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his posses-
sions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest
and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the principles of inter-
national law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State
to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accor-
dance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contri-
butions or penalties.
See generally Antinori, supra note 44, at 1796-1808. (With respect to the categorical approach
employed elsewhere, see notes below and accompanying text.)
46. See generally Philip Weinberg, Essay: Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey: Will the Supreme
Court Stretch the Takings Clause Beyond the Breaking Point?, 26 B.C. ENVTL AFF. L. REV. 315
(1999); Wagner, supra note 8, at 502-10.
47. See PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 703-10 (3d ed. 1992).
48. See id.
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compensation obligations or (2) limiting compensation obligations to cases in which the
economic value of the property in question is totally or almost totally destroyed would
achieve this limiting effect. However, each approach is contradicted or undermined by the
breadth of the definition of property rights used in chapter 11.
NAFTA article 1139 defines "investment" for the purposes of chapter 11 so as to
cover a wide range of property interests including, among other things, various equity
and debt securities, some types of loans, and, in articles 1139(g) and (h):
(g) real estate or other property, tangible or intangible, acquired in the
expectation or used for the purpose of economic benefit or other busi-
ness purposes; and
(h) interests arising from the commitment of capital or other resources in
the territory of a Party to economic activity in such territory, such as
under
(i) contracts involving the presence of an investor's property in the ter-
ritory of the Party, including turnkey contracts or concessions, or
(ii) contracts where remuneration depends substantially on the pro-
duction,.revenues or profits of an enterprise.
The broad language of article 1139 appears to cover both the replacement value of
most forms of business property and the interests such as reasonable expectations of
profit. Moreover, it is unlikely to be read narrowly given that international law has tradi-
tionally recognized that expropriation compensation claims may be made in respect of a
wide range of property interests.49
It could be argued that the article 1110 claims limit themselves to seeking compensation
for regulations that have the effect of entirely or substantially destroying the economic value
of the complainant's property, and only such regulatory measures should give rise to com-
pensation liability. However, this attempt to limit the reach of chapter 11 is undermined by
the endless variation of the forms that property rights take.50 Many claims to things of value
can come to be treated as property rights, and, as noted above, most business property rights
interests will be protected under chapter 11. Established property interests, such as owner-
ship rights in a business, can be divided into many components: bundles of customer and
supplier contracts, intellectual property rights, ownership of a subsidiary corporation, and so
on. These rights can in turn be broken down into various rights of use, to exclude others
from, or to alienate all or part of the property interest.
Property rights can thus be redefined or subdivided so as to isolate the interests most
affected by regulation and thus create a compensation liability. 51 For example, suppose
49. See Dolzer, supra note 43, at 44-47; CHARLES BROWER & JASON BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN - UNITED
STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 372-75 (1998); Giorgio Sacerdoti, Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral
Instruments on investment Protection, 269 RECUEIL DES COURS 251, 381 ("All Rights and interests
having an economic content come into play, including immaterial and contractual rights.").
50. Contemporary conceptions of property rights are informed by the thinking of early twentieth
century legal realists, who tend to conceive of property rights as bundles of rights that could be
(and in the modern economy routinely are) disassembled and recombined into different con-
figurations. MARY JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY (1993); ROBERTO M. UNGER, WHAT
SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? (1996).
51. Radin describes this move as a strategy of conceptual severance. See RADIN, supra note 50, at
127-28.
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that the government prohibits the sale of a type of fertilizer. An ownership interest in a
large diversified enterprise producing the fertilizer would probably not on the whole be
sufficiently affected to form the subject of a compensation claim. However, a patent that
it holds on a key ingredient in fertilizer, or a set of contracts to sell the fertilizer, probably
would be, as would a small undiversified enterprise producing nothing but this fertilizer.
Similarly, in the S.D. Myers case the property interests affected by the impugned regulato-
ry measure were a set of contracts to transport and dispose of PCB waste.52 In the
Methanex cases the investor complains of a loss of customer base, goodwill, market for its
product, capital investments made in developing and serving the MTBE market, and cap-
ital investments in its U.S. subsidiary.5 3
On the whole it is difficult to imagine a new regulatory measure that would not
undermine the value of some property rights and thus become the potential object of a
compensation claim. An astute producer, anticipating the possibility of regulation of its
products, might even arrange its investments so as to receive some compensation in the
event of regulation.
Thus, the broad scope of property protection sought by the claims, combined with
NAFTA's extensive definition of protected property interests, has the potential to create
compensation obligations where property rights meet a wide range of regulatory mea-
sures. Imposing compensation obligations on such a basis could profoundly alter the cur-
rent balance between regulation and property owner autonomy in the NAFTA countries.
Thus, regulatory room to maneuver probably cannot be secured consistently with an eco-
nomic effects test for compensable measures. In North America a balancing test would
arguably lack political legitimacy and a sound legal basis. At the end of the day, it appears
that either some or all regulatory measures will be categorically distinguished from mea-
sures giving rise to compensation obligations under chapter 11 or many such measures
will run the risk generating compensation claims.
II. NAFTA's Chapter 11 - Can Regulation be Expropriation?
In its response to the Ethyl case, the Canadian government drew a distinction
between the taking of property and regulation. 54 It argued that only the former gave rise
to compensation obligations under article 1110, because regulatory measures falling
within the "police powers" of the state are treated by international law as outside the
scope of a "taking" of property.
Under article 1110, the Canadian government's position raises the following questions:
(1) Which regulatory measures fall within the police power of the state?
(2) Can such regulatory measures constitute a direct or indirect expropriation or
nationalization?
(3) Can they be tantamount to expropriation or nationalization?
52. See S.D. Myers case, supra note 21.
53. See Notice of Intent, supra note 23, at 3.
54. See MANN & VON MILTKE, supra note 26, at 42.
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A. POLICE POWERS.
International tribunals and legal scholars have long recognized the principle that a
state is not liable for economic injury that is a consequence of bona fide regulation within
the accepted police power of the state.55 However, the description of the police power
offered in these sources remains vague. At the core of the concept appears to be the power
to regulate in the interests of public health, safety, morals, or welfare. 56 One knowledge-
able writer has added that "anti-trust, consumer protection, securities, environmental
protection, land planning and other legislation are non-compensable takings" because
such regulations are regarded as essential to the efficient functioning of the state.57
However, at least one review of international tribunal decisions has concluded that the
public purpose of a measure is not by itself sufficient to establish the exercise of a police
power. 58 Moreover, the language of article 1110 appears to be consistent with this view. It is
the combination of both a public purpose and a bona fide regulatory measure that defines
an exercise of the police power. Since the range of public purposes included within the police
power appears to be wide and relatively undefined, and since deference can be expected from
international tribunals in the face of a state'sassertion of a public purpose,59 the key to
understanding the police power exception to international compensation rules lies in the dis-
tinction between bona fide regulation and compensable measures.
B. EXPROPRIATION, NATIONALIZATION, AND MEASURES TANTAMOUNT TO EXPROPRIATION
OR NATIONALIZATION.
NAFTA provides little guidance concerning the meaning of "expropriation" or
"nationalization." Neither term is defined in the agreement. While the language of the
Preamble to NAFTA suggests an interpretive need to reconcile regulatory flexibility with a
predictable commercial framework for investment, 60 the agreement does not purport to
spell out how that reconciliation should be accomplished.
Treaty provisions are to be interpreted in their context, which includes any agree-
ment relating to the treaty that was made between all the parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty.6 1 Arguably the North American Agreement for Environmental
Cooperation (NAAEC) and the North American Agreement for Labor Cooperation con-
55. Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 248, 275; G.C. Christie, What
Constitutes a Taking of Property Under International Law, 38 BRITISH Y.B. INT'L L. 307, 331-32
(1962); George Aldrich, What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property? The Decisions of
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 585 (1994).
56. See Christie, supra note 55, at 338.
57. M. SORNORAIAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 283 (1993).
58. See Aldrich, supra note 55, at 609 (concluding that "Liability is not affected by the fact that the
state has acted to legitimate economic and social reasons in accordance with its laws.").
59. See Christie, supra note 55, at 338.
60. See Preamble, providing, among other things, that the governments of Canada, Mexico, and
the United States of America resolved to "Ensure a predictable commercial framework for
business planning and investment;" "Preserve their flexibility to safeguard the public welfare;"
"Promote sustainable development;" "Strengthen the development and enforcement of envi-
ronmental laws and regulations;" and "Protect, enhance and enforce basic workers' rights."
61. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), 8 I.L.M. 679
(1969), art. 31.
Autumn 1999 511
stitute such agreements and thus form part of the context in which chapter 11 of NAFTA
should be interpreted. 62 These agreements include clear commitments on the part of
NAFTA member countries to provide for high labor and environmental standards and to
enforce those standards effectively.63 This suggests that NAFTA's chapter 11 should be
interpreted so as to provide the member states with scope to regulate, at least in the areas
on environmental and labor protection. However, neither side agreement provides any
direct guidance with respect to how such regulatory measures are distinguished from
compensable expropriations, and whether regulation can constitute or be tantamount to
an expropriation.
The interpretive provisions of chapter 11 addressing the relationship between social
policy goals and its investment rules provide little further direction. In fact, they do little
more than indicate that, in some cases, measures designed to secure such goals may be
inconsistent with those rules, though not necessarily with article 1110.64
What little guidance is provided in NAFTA must be gleaned indirectly from subjects
that are expressly included or excluded from the scope of article 1110. Article 1110(7) pro-
vides that article 1110 does not apply to the revocation, limitation, or creation of intellectual
property rights, or to the issuance of compulsory intellectual property rights licenses, provid-
ed that such measures are consistent with chapter 17 of NAFTA. Chapter 17 sets out mini-
mum standards for the protection of intellectual property. Article 1110(7) appears to be
designed to carve out intellectual property from the investment protection provisions of
chapter 11, deferring to the more complete set of rules in chapter 17. The unqualified lan-
guage of article 1110(7)65 implies that but for this carve-out, revoking, limiting, creating, or
62. Wagner, supra note 8, at 529.
63. The NAAEC affirms in its preamble "the importance of the environmental goals and objectives
of the NAFTA, including enhanced levels of environmental protection" and states that those
goals also form part of the objectives of the NAAEC (Preamble, art. 1). The Agreement goes on
to provide that each country shall ensure that its laws and regulations provide for high levels of
environmental protection and shall strive to continue to improve upon those laws and regula-
tions (art. 3). The NAAEC uses a broad definition of environmental law (art. 45). Similarly,
the NAALC recalls the resolve of the countries in NAFTA to protect, enhance, and enforce
basic workers' rights, and commits the parties to ensuring that their laws and regulations pro-
vide for high labor standards and to continuing to strive to improve those standards in that
light (Preamble, art. 2). Like the NAAEC's definition of environmental law, the NAALC uses a
broad definition of labor law (art. 49).
64. Article 1101(4) commands those interpreting chapter 11 to not construe it so as to prevent a
party from providing a range of public services (such as policing or social welfare) "in a man-
ner that is not inconsistent" with that chapter. This wording seems to allow interpretations of
chapter 1I that prevent a party from providing those services in a manner that is inconsistent
with the chapter. It also suggests, without providing more information, that in some circum-
stances such services could be provided in a way that is inconsistent with chapter 11. Similarly,
article 1114(t) provides that nothing in chapter It shall be construed to prevent a party from
adopting any environmental measure otherwise consistent with that chapter. The net effect of
the "otherwise consistent" qualifier in article 1114(1) is to indicate that an environmental mea-
sure will not necessarily comply with chapter 11 simply by virtue of being an environmental
measure.
65. The drafters, for example, could have indicated that its provisions were "for greater certainty,"
as they did in article 1110(8).
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requiring compulsory licensing of intellectual property, or by extension other property, could
fall within the expropriation and compensation provisions of article 1110(1).
Article 2103(6) specifically provides that article 1110 shall apply to taxation measures
(while requiring investors seeking to challenge such measures to abide by the rulings of
domestic tax authorities), indicating that in some cases at least such measures could trig-
ger article 1110's compensation obligations. 66
On the other hand, article 1110(8) provides "for greater certainty" that a non-dis-
criminatory measure of general application shall not be considered a measure tanta-
mount to expropriation of a debt security or loan solely on the ground that the measure
imposes costs on the debtor that cause it to default on the debt. Since article 1110(8) is
provided "for greater certainty," it can be inferred that the measures that it expressly
excludes from the scope of article 11 10(1)'s obligations are simply an example of a more
general class of measures that fall outside that article's scope.
The class of measures expressly referred to in article 1110(8) could easily include a
wide range of government actions, from starkly redistributive laws to technical produc-
tion or product regulations. For example, the priority for income tax obligations over
obligations to secured creditors in Canadian and U.S. bankruptcy law could lead directly
to a debtor's defaulting on a loan obligation. A similar measure is found in employment
legislation in a number of Canadian jurisdictions deeming a part of an employer's funds
to constitute a trust in favor of its employees for the purposes of meeting certain remu-
neration obligations to those employees.67 Obligations under these trust arrangements
can take priority over the claims of some creditors. On the other hand, article 1110(8)
could also cover ordinary regulatory measures that raise the costs of doing business, such
as production process pollution controls, and happen to trigger the insolvency of a com-
pany owing money to an investor under a debt obligation. One could probably imagine as
many different examples of article 1110(8) measures as there are ways for indebted enter-
prises to encounter government regulation. These considerations suggest that a wide
range of regulatory measures may affect the value of an investment without constituting
an expropriation or a measure tantamount to one.
A measure tantamount to an expropriation is one effectively or functionally equivalent
to an expropriation. 68 Article 1110(8) implies that a measure resulting in the total destruc-
tion of the value of an investment, the most dramatic of economic effects, is not necessarily
tantamount to an expropriation. It is also important to note that article 1110(8) refers only
66. NAFTA article 2101 does not apply the exceptions to trade in goods rules to chapter 11. This
could be read as suggesting that exceptions such as those do not apply to NAFTAs investment
rules. On the other hand, it could be read as an implied recognition that a police powers
exception to those rules is understood to exist. Given these ambiguities, it appears that little
weight can be attached to the fact that article 2101 does not apply to chapter 11.
67. See generally G. ENGLAND, I. CHRISTIE & M. CHRISTIE, EMPLOYMENT LAw IN CANADA § 19.58 (3d
ed. 1998).
68. This interpretation is consistent with the language used in the French and Spanish versions of
NAFTA. The French version uses the term "equivalent" for "tantamount" and the Spanish ver-
sion uses "equivalente;" both are terms that refer to things that are equal or identical in value
function or effect. See Le Nouveau Petit Robert (Paris: Dictionaires le Robert, 1996) and
Diccionario de la Lengua Esponola, Vigesima, Primera Edition (Spain: Real Academic
Esponola, 1996).
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to measures tantamount to expropriation, and not to expropriation per se, whether direct or
indirect. This suggests that the concept of expropriation, whether direct or indirect, cannot
be defined solely by reference to the economic effects of a measure and thus is most plausibly
essentially defined by its legal nature as a transaction.69
Finally, it should be noted that simply having a public purpose does not exclude a
measure from the category of expropriations. Indeed, public purpose alone cannot be
sufficient to exempt a measure from article 1110's scope, because such a purpose is one of
the four conditions that an expropriation or nationalization must meet, along with the
payment of compensation, for such measures to escape outright prohibition under article
1110. On the other hand, this does not necessarily imply that no public purpose is suffi-
cient to exclude a measure from the category of expropriations, it simply implies that not
all public purposes will be sufficient to do so.
To sum up, the wording of article 1110 suggests that
(1) Whether a measure constitutes an expropriation, direct or indirect,
depends upon the legal nature of the measure and not necessarily upon its
economic consequences. However, the legal nature of the measure should
not be determined overly formalistically, since an expropriation can be
accomplished directly or indirectly.
(2) A measure tantamount to an expropriation is one that is effectively or
functionally equivalent to an expropriation.
(3) A wide range of measures may affect the value of an investment without
constituting an expropriation or a measure tantamount to one.
(4) Not all measures destroying the value of an investment are tantamount to
an expropriation, nor, a fortiori, are they an expropriation per se.
(5) The fact that a measure has a public purpose does not categorically
exempt it from the compensation obligations of article 1110. However, it
remains possible that some public purposes will result in such exemption.
(6) The range of measures that can trigger compensation obligations under
article 1110 includes taxation measures, and probably includes revocation,
creation, or limitation of property rights, compulsory property licensing
laws, and similar measures. This does not necessarily imply that all such
measures will trigger compensation obligations.
These propositions leave vague the distinction between compensable and non-com-
pensation measures under chapter 11. On the side of compensable measures, we lack a
specific description of the legal transaction of expropriation, and of the kind of function-
al or effective equivalency between an expropriation and a measure tantamount to one. If
a measure is not tantamount to expropriation because it causes the destruction of the
69. This would suggest that the indirectness or directness of an expropriation does not refer to the
way in which a set of economic effects are achieved, but rather to the way that the legal trans-
action of expropriation is carried out. Whether an expropriation is carried out indirectly or
directly, the end result is a legal one and is the same. Thus, the scope of the set of measures
that are tantamount, that is, equivalent to an expropriation will be the same whether the
expropriation is carried out directly or indirectly. Thus, there is no meaningful distinction
between measures tantamount to direct expropriation and measures tantamount to indirect
expropriation.
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value of an investment, what in the alternative or in addition is required? Similar ques-
tions arise on the side of non-compensable measures. If some regulatory measures are
non-compensable, how are they distinguished from those of taxation, licensing, or other
measures that are, under certain circumstances at least, potentially compensable mea-
sures? Would a test of the bona fides of the measure suffice for this purpose?
Modern tribunals deciding expropriation claims have relied principally on judicial
and arbitral precedent. 70 On the question of defining expropriation, however, the inter-
national jurisprudence remains relatively undeveloped. Historically, international legal
decisions and scholarship have been far more preoccupied with the rules governing com-
pensation for expropriation than with defining expropriation itself.71 In most cases con-
fronted by international tribunals it has been clear that an expropriation has taken place
by almost any definition of the term. 72 Perhaps as a result, the historical record of inter-
national tribunal decisions provides a scant articulation of which measures give rise to
compensation obligations. Indeed, as late as 1986, a careful reviewer of international tri-
bunal decisions, international investment treaties, and state practice concluded that the
boundary line between regulation and expropriation remained essentially undefined in
international law. 73
The leading recent source of decisions on the international law of expropriation is
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. The decisions of this tribunal constitute the most
extensive set of investor-state arbitrations ever undertaken. 74 Events following the over-
throw of the Shah of Iran in 1979 led to claims for compensation both by American prop-
erty owners in Iran and Iranian property owners in the United States. The Tribunal has
rendered approximately fifty awards addressing claims for the taking of property arising
out of those events. 75
70. Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals and the
International Law of Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 474 (1991).
71. Dolzer, supra note 43, at 41. See, e.g., PAUL COMEAUX & STEPHEN KINSELLA, PROTECTING FOREIGN
INVESTMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (1997).
72. The point of contention, particularly in the immediate post-colonial period, generally con-
cerned whether and to what extent compensation might be owed for expropriated property
rights, particularly rights to exploit natural resources that had been acquired by foreigners dur-
ing colonial rule. Arguments often focused on the legitimacy of the means through which
such property was acquired and the nature of national sovereignty over natural resources, as
newly emerging nation states sought to justify nationalizations of industries and enterprises
formerly controlled by individuals or corporations based in the colonial powers. Similar
debates surrounded the expropriation of industries and enterprises under nationalist econom-
ic programs in Latin America, most notably, for present purposes, the nationalization of the oil
industry in Mexico in 1938. In this context there was little need to develop an extensive map-
ping of the boundaries of expropriation, because the existence of expropriation itself was sel-
dom at issue. The desire to assure investors that they would be fully compensated in the event
of a resurgence of nationalist economic programs appears to have informed the drafting of
chapter 11. Article 1110 devotes far more attention to defining the measures, means, and tim-
ing of compensation than to defining expropriation itself (11 10(2)-(6)). See generally
COMEAUX & KINSELLA, supra note 71, at ch. 3; SORNORAIAH, supra note 57, at ch. 7.
73. See Dolzer, supra note 43.
74. MANN & VON MILTKE, supra note 26, at 39-40.
75. BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 49, at 369.
Autumn 1999 515
However, some caution is required in interpreting the Tribunal's case law. The foun-
dation of the Tribunal's jurisdiction is article II, paragraph 1 of the Claims Settlement
Declaration, which gave the Tribunal authority to resolve disputes arising out of "expro-
priations and other measures affecting property rights. '76 This language clearly encom-
passes a greater range of measures than expropriations. While there is some disagreement
over whether it extends the Tribunal's jurisdiction beyond the categories of acts already
recognized by international law as giving rise to compensation obligations, 77 the Claims
Settlement Declaration's mandate certainly appears no less broad than the "measures tan-
tamount" language of NAFTA's article I 110, and is arguably broader. Moreover, as one
member of the Tribunal has noted, the breadth of its jurisdiction may have led to a cer-
tain degree of laxity on the part of the Tribunal in maintaining definitional distinctions
between terms such as "expropriation," "appropriation' "deprivation," "taking," and
"other measures affecting property rights. '78 Moreover, "the outcome of the cases seems
to have depended more upon the facts surrounding the alleged taking than the descrip-
tion of the underlying act."79
Nonetheless, the Tribunal's jurisprudence can provide some useful points of refer-
ence. First, the Tribunal's definition of expropriation can be seen as establishing at least
an outer bound for the definition of the term, given the already noted tendency of the
Tribunal to allow the boundaries between "expropriation" and "other measures affecting
property rights" to become indistinct. Second, because of the breadth of its mandate, a
Tribunal decision that a measure did not give rise to compensation obligations under the.
Claims Settlement Declaration can be taken as a reliable indicator that similar measures
should not give rise to such liability under chapter 11.
In Amoco International Finance Corporation,80 the Tribunal equated expropriation
with "a compulsory transfer of property rights." This unsurprising definition is consistent
with other international law precedent. 81 However, the Tribunal did not limit the class of-
compensable measures to formal expropriations. Rather, it tended instead to use the-
broader concept of compensable "takings." This concept should be understood in light of
four groups of cases giving different general formulations of it.8 2 The first adopts ano
"unreasonable interference" test.8 3 The second requires "interference to such an extent
that the property rights are rendered so useless that they must be deemed to have been
expropriated." The third, "non-ephemeral deprivation of the fundamental rights of own-
ership "' 84 These last two groups of cases tend to rely upon each other for support and
76. Claims Settlement Declaration, Jan. 20, 1981, U.S.-Iran, art. 11, 20 I.L.M. 230, 231.
77. RICHARD LILLICH & DANIEL BARSTOW, THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE
LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 218, n.1 10 and accompanying text (1998).
78. BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 49, at 380-8 1.
79. Id. at 382.
80. 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189 (1987).
81. Sacerdoti, supra note 49, at 379 (expropriation defined as coercive appropriation of private
property by the state); see also Sporrong and Lonnroth v. Sweden, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1982), at 24 (formal expropriation requires a transfer of ownership).
82. BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 49, at 378.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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thus their tests need to be interpreted in light of each other.85 Finally, in a fourth line of
cases, the Tribunal has examined whether the "effective" use of the property has been
lost.8 6 Taken together, these formulations suggest that, for there to be a compensable tak-
ing, there must be a sufficient degree of interference with the most important rights of
ownership for that interference to be equivalent to a transfer of the property. As noted
above, the concept of a "compensable taking" used by the Tribunal arguably constitutes
an outer bound for the definitions of "indirect expropriation" and "measures tantamount
to expropriation" under chapter 11 of NAFTA.
The Tribunal found that compensation was owed in cases where Iran unilaterally
took possession or ownership of an enterprise.87 On the theory that the right to partici-
pate in the management of an enterprise is the most fundamental right of its majority
owner, the Tribunal also found that the non-temporary appointment by Iran of a manag-
er to run the enterprise constituted a compensable taking.88 In the Amoco International
Financial Corporation case, the Tribunal found that compensation was owed on account
of the Iranian government's unilateral annulment of its agreement with the complainant
under which Amoco obtained the right to exploit Iranian oil resources and on the basis of
which the company made substantial investments. 89 In general, it appears that where the
government took control of an enterprise or asset from its owner, the Tribunal found lia-
bility, regardless of whether that asset had been formally expropriated. This is in line with
earlier international jurisprudence. 90 The Tribunal made these findings even where it
acknowledged the public purposes behind the measures. 9 1
85. Id.
86. Id. at 379.
87. BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 49, at 384-85, and cases cited therein.
88. Id. at 395-410, and cases cited therein.
89. Amoco Int'l Fin. Corp. v. Gov't of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl.'Trib. Rep. 189
(1987).
90. An early seminal case is Case Concerning Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1927
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7 (May 25, 1926). In that case, the claim was based upon agreements
between Germany and Poland for the protection of the German minority in Upper Silesia in
which Poland had undertaken not to expropriate certain property of German nationals. The
Polish government transferred from a German owner to itself the property rights to a piece of
land with an industrial plant. A compensation claim was made by a company holding contrac-
tual rights to administer, use, and benefit from the industrial plant. The Court found in favor
of the contract holder. Among its reasons, the Court stated that "the rights of Bayerische to the
exploitation of the factory and to the remuneration fixed by the contract for the management
of the exploitation and for the use of its patents, licenses, experiments, etc., have been directly
prejudiced by the taking over of the factory by Poland." Id. at 44. In his influential article,
supra note 55, Professor G.C. Christie reviewed a number of decisions by the International
Claims Commission and its successor the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, domestic
U.S. tribunals established to rule on the validity of claims by U.S. Nationals based on war dam-
age and nationalizations of property in the former Soviet Union and former Soviet bloc coun-
tries including Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria. The pay-
ment of the claims was often provided for under agreements between the United States and
those countries, and the funds to be distributed were funds belonging to the governments of
those countries and which had been frozen by the United States government, and under the
terms of those agreements transferred into accounts for the purpose of claims payments.
Among the decisions of the tribunals were rulings that:
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On the other hand, it appears that in cases other than those where the government
took possession of property or control of the management of an enterprise or unilaterally
voided a concession contract, the Tribunal denied compensation, even where the measure
in question undermined the value of the property, provided that the measure had a bona
fide public purpose.
For example, the Tribunal found that a law rearranging the way in which payments
were made to construction companies did not constitute a compensable taking. 92
Similarly, a law establishing certain authentication requirements before a bank may honor
a check, as a result of which the claimant's check was not honored, was found not to con-
stitute "an unreasonable interference" with the claimait's property rights. 93 These deci-
sions are consistent with that in Sporrong and Lonnroth v. Sweden,94 the leading case
under the European Convention on Human Rights. There, the European Court of
Human Rights found that an order in place for twenty-three years giving the city of
Stockholm the power to expropriate the claimants' property, taken together with another
law prohibiting new buildings or significant changes to the existing houses on their land,
did not amount to a deprivation of possessions. The Court noted that while the property
was more difficult to sell because of these measures, selling it was not impossible and the
plaintiffs still had use of it while the measures were in place. 95
More interestingly, in a series of decisions the Tribunal found that state measures
preventing the conversion of bank accounts into foreign exchange and their removal
from the country did not constitute compensable takings. 96 In Sea-Land Service, Inc. v.
* Measures by the Czechoslovak government requiring that landlords deposit rental
payments with the government and giving the government the right to select ten-
ants for rental dwellings, amounted to expropriation on the grounds that the
owner was by virtue of these measures "precluded from the free and unrestricted
use of such realty and its fruits, and even though he remains the record owner he
is to all intents and purposes practically.., managing and collecting... [rent] for
the government." Id. at 315.
* The appointment of a national administrator to liquidate a business constituted a
"compensable taking."
See also Arthur Nussbaum, The Arbitration between the Lena Goldfields, Ltd. and the Soviet
Government, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 31 (1950).
91. Phelps Dodge Int'l Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep 157 (1986); see
also Sedco Inc., 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 275. For a consistent decision by another tribunal see
Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 32 I.L.M. 933
(1993); Report to the Development Committee on the Legal Framework for the Treatment of
Foreign Investment, 8 ICSID REV. 328 (1992).
92. Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 122, 154 (1983).
93. Harza Engineering Co. v. Iran, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 499, 504 (1982). The Tribunal
declined in this case to determine "how unreasonable the interference must be to constitute a
taking of property."
94. Sporrong and Lonnroth, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24 (1982).
95. Id. at 24-25.
96. See cases discussed in BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 49, at 391-94, and in LILLICH &
BARSTOW, supra note 77, at 241. These decisions would appear to be consistent with a line of
case discussed in Christie, supra note 55, at 318:
"In several interesting proposed decisions formulated in the processing of
Czechoslovakian claims, however, the Commission held that certain fairly sub-
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Iran,97 the Tribunal denied compensation for the failure of the Iranian central bank to
authorize a bank account transfer. A Tribunal majority held that a central bank is
invested with a certain margin of discretion in granting permission for such transfers
into foreign currency, and there was insufficient evidence to establish that the bank had
intentionally obstructed the transfer application or unlawfully interfered with-Sea-
Land's use of its account, or otherwise exercised this discretion in an unreasonable or
discriminatory way.98 In two other cases, Tribunal majorities denied compensation for
restrictions on international capital transfers authorized under the International
Monetary Fund Agreement.99 The majorities did not address the question of whether
such capital transfer restrictions could ever give rise to compensation obligations. In
one case the dissenting Tribunal member would have ruled that compensation was
owed on the view that the exchange control power had been exercised in a confiscatory
manner and not in good faith.100
These decisions can be contrasted with another line of cases in which the Tribunal
found that preventing the export of productive equipment deprived the owner of effec-
tive use, benefit, and control of the equipment, thus constituting a compensable tak-
ing.' 0 ' It appears that the Tribunal recognized a legitimate regulatory purpose behind
exchange controls, buttressed by the terms of the International Monetary Fund
Agreement, 10 2 whereas in the equipment removal cases no such purpose supported the
government's defense.
This interpretation is consistent with an earlier ruling of the Permanent Court of
International Justice. 103 In the Oscar Chinn case, the Court held that the Belgian govern-
ment owed no compensation to a shipper who claimed that his business had been bank-
rupted by the actions of that government in subsidizing a state-controlled competitor.
The parties to the case appear to have accepted that the Belgian government acted in
order to provide low cost river transportation services to businesses in the Belgian Congo
at the onset of a severe economic downturn. 104 In reaching its decision the Court stated
stantial interferences with personal property did not constitute a 'taking' Thus, it
has been held that the refusal to grant an export license for jewelry or to permit
the transfer of funds abroad did not constitute a 'taking' of property under inter-
national law. In ... the proposed decisions the Commission has held that the sus-
pension of payment of interest upon bonds or the failure to continue to make
pension payments did not by themselves constitute la] ... 'taking' of the bonds or
. .. the pension rights:'
97. 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 149 (1984).
98. Id. at 167. The majority went on to note that the funds remained available to Sea-Land for use
within Iran. Id. However, as the dissent another case pointed out, for all practical purposes a
U.S. National could not use Rials in Iran in the years immediately following the revolution.
Hood Corporation v. Iran, 7 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 36, 50 (dissenting opinion of Mosk J.)
[hereinafter Hood Cooperation].
99. See id.; Dallal v. Iran, 3 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. 10.
100. See Hood Corporation, supra note 98, at 49 (dissenting opinion of Mosk J.).
101. See cases discussed in BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 49, at 387-88.
102. See LILLICH & BARSTOW, supra note 77, at 256 ("[A]ny conclusions that exchange controls have
amounted to expropriation under customary international law would appear to presuppose
that they go beyond what is permitted by the Articles of Agreement of the I.M.F.").
103. Oscar Chinn (U.K. v. Belg.), 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 63 (Dec. 12).
104. This eventually became known as the Great Depression.
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that it was agnostic about whether as a factual matter Chinn's bankruptcy was caused by
the Belgian government's measures or by his alleged earlier financial troubles. 10 5 It
appears to have treated what happened to Chinn as part and parcel of a change in busi-
ness circumstances resulting from general economic conditions. 106 The narrow implica-
tion of this finding is that a government may act to stimulate economic activity in times
of severe recession, even if this has the effect of bankrupting an enterprise, without being
liable for compensation. Arguably, analogies to measures taken in response to other press-
ing public purposes could be drawn.
III. Conclusion.
The tests articulated by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunals to separate com-
pensable and non-compensable measures tended, as did those of earlier Tribunals, 107 to
be broadly and vaguely worded. Taken on their face, some versions (such as the "unrea-
sonable interference" theory of compensable takings) of the test offer investors an oppor-
tunity to argue that regulatory measures that have a substantial economic impact on the
value of their property rights should be compensable. However, these tests need to be
understood in relation to the fact situations that have thus far actually given rise to liabili-
ty. The case law does not on the whole support using an economic effects test as the key
determinant of compensation liability. The concept of formal expropriation appears to
have been limited, in general, to actual transfers of title from a property owner to the gov-
ernment or another entity. Tribunals have on the whole not applied the broader category
of compensable takings to bona fide regulations of property use, even where such regula-
tion results in the loss to the owner of most, if not all, viable economic uses of the proper-
ty. Compensable "taking" findings have generally been limited to cases in which the gov-
ernment actually took possession or control of an enterprise or other substantial property;
interest, formally voided a set of property rights that an investor had relied upon in mak-'
ing further investments, or without a bona fide regulatory purpose so restricted the use of-
the property as to deprive the owner of any benefit of it.
There is no apparent reason why the terms "indirect expropriation" and "measures
tantamount to expropriation" in article 1110 should not be interpreted consistently with
this understanding of the case law. Defining expropriation as a compulsory transfer of
property and measures tantamount to expropriation as non-temporary deprivations of
some or all of a limited class of legal rights, and holding that regulatory measures would
not give rise to compensation obligations provided that they are bona fide is consistent
with each of the implications of article 1110's language identified above.
However, some caveats are in order with respect to these conclusions. Nearly every
scholar who has attempted to map the definition of "indirect expropriation" or "com-
pensable takings" in international law has concluded that it is rife with ambiguity.10 8
105. 1934 P.C.I.J. at 75.
106. Id. at 88.
107. See Dolzer, supra note 43; Sacerdoti, supra note 49.
108. See Sacerdoti, supra note 49, at 383; Dolzer, supra note 43, at 43-44, 55-56; Christie, supra note
55, at 331, 336; SORNORAJAH, supra note 57, at 227, 283, 300, 321.
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Similarly, an internal memo prepared by the Canadian government in response to the
Ethyl case notes that the line between takings and regulation is uncertain.1 09 This is per-
haps not surprising given the sparseness of the case law and the political controversy sur-
rounding its development."1 0 In any event, there appears to be an inevitable measure of
uncertainty to be attached to any general conclusions in this area of law.
One key area of uncertainty lies in the issue of whether an investor who is deprived
of the rights to use an investment to the extent that it is no longer economically viable
may be denied compensation on the basis that this was the result of a bona fide regulato-
ry measure. I have suggested above that such a result would be consistent with the state of
the case law. However, the jurisprudence does not in general squarely face this issue.1 II
This is an important ambiguity. Assessing the extent of deprivation of rights to use
an investment according to its remaining economic viability inevitably opens the deci-
sion-maker to considering economic effects of impugned government measures. The
extent to which economic effects are considered may be crucial to the outcome of cases,
such as the S.D. Myers claim, in which the use value of an investment was allegedly
destroyed by an apparently bona fide regulatory measure.
The United States has a dense jurisprudence addressing the question of when regula-
tion amounts to a compensable taking under the United States Constitution. Subject to
certain qualifications, that jurisprudence has specifically considered the economic effects
of regulations in determining whether they give rise to compensation obligations.," 2
Some scholars have suggested that Tribunals established under chapter 11 may draw upon
the domestic law of NAFTA member countries as a source of general principles of inter-
national law that may close gaps in the international jurisprudence and that U.S. jurispru-
dence may prove an important source in this regard. 113
109. MANN & VON MILTKE, supra note 26, at 42.
110. See generally Norton, supra note 70; SORNORAIAH, supra note 57.
111. In the Hood Corporation and Dallal cases, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal appears to have
assumed without providing reasons that compliance with IMF Agreement provisions sanction-
ing exchange controls would not give rise to compensation liability. In the Sea-Land case, the
Tribunal relied in part upon its finding that the claimant's bank account remained available to
the claimant in Rials, for use in Iran. The reasoning in the Chinn decision is cryptic at best.
112. See Wagner, supra note 8, at 502-10. The U.S. Supreme Court's use of economic effects in
determining whether a regulatory measure gives rise to compensation liability is constrained
by a number of doctrines. The Court has required that investors have reasonable investment-
backed expectations, and has applied economic effects analysis to the relevant property rights
"bundle... in its entirety" rather than subsets of property rights. However, as discussed above,
the latter type of qualification is susceptible to instability. A court or tribunal that is relatively
eager to protect property rights may see an entire bundle where others would see only a subset.
There is some evidence that some current members of the United States Supreme Court are
tending in this direction. See Weinberg, supra note 46. The doctrine of "reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectation[s]" incorporates detailed doctrines affirming the relative sanctity of
real property as opposed to other commercial property and doctrines of public nuisance devel-
oped within the U.S. legal tradition.
113. See Wagner, supra note 8, at 501; David Schneiderman, NAFTA's Takings Rule: American
Constitutionalism Comes to Canada, 46 U. ToRONTo L.J. 499 (1996).
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I want to close by suggesting caution in drawing upon this source. Importing U.S.
case law would run counter to a conscious political choice central to Canadian constitu-
tional law. The constitutional protection of property found in the United States has no
counterpart in Canada. 114 This is the result of recent and deliberate political choices to
maintain regulatory flexibility in economic matters. 115 Under Canadian law a legislature
may enact a statute that expropriates without compensation, provided that it does so by
clear language. 116 While most Canadian jurisdictions do in fact provide mechanisms
through which compensation for expropriation can be sought, 117 the fact remains that in
difficult cases the legislature retains the ultimate right to decide the matter. Article 1110
represents something of a derogation from this principle for the benefit of foreign
investors. How much of a derogation it represents will clearly depend upon the breadth of
the definition of expropriation under that article. It should not be assumed lightly that
the NAFTA parties intended to import U.S. takings jurisprudence, since within Canadian
domestic politics a conscious decision was made not to do so.
114. HOGG, supra note 47, at 703-10.
115. Id. See also A. Alvaro, Why Property Rights Were Excluded from the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, 34 CAN. REV. POL. Sci. 309 (1991); Jean MacBean, The Implication of Entrenching
Property Rights in Section 7 of the Charter, 26 ALTA L. REV. 548 (1988).
116. HOGG, supra note 47.
117. See generally ERIC C. TODD, THE LAW OF EXPROPRIATION AND COMPENSATION IN CANADA
(Toronto: Carswell, 2d ed. 1992).
